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Abstract: 
This paper analyzes a panel of 18 European countries spanning from 1950 to 2003 to 
examine the extent to which the legal reforms leading to “easier divorce” that took place 
during the second half of the 20th century have contributed to the increase in divorce rates 
across Europe. We use a quasi-experimental set-up and exploit the different timing of the 
reforms in divorce laws across countries. We account for unobserved country-specific 
factors by introducing country fixed effects, and we include country-specific trends to 
control for time-varying factors at the country level that may be correlated with divorce 
rates and divorce laws, such as changing social norms or slow moving demographic 
trends. We find that the different reforms that “made divorce easier” were followed by 
significant increases in divorce rates. The effect of no-fault legislation was strong and 
permanent, while unilateral reforms only had a temporary effect on divorce rates. 
Overall, we estimate that the legal reforms account for about 20 percent of the increase in 
divorce rates in Europe between 1960 and 2002. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent rise in divorce rates in industrialized countries has generated a great deal of 
attention from researchers and policy makers. Many worry about the negative economic 
consequences of divorce for women and children, and there is some evidence that more 
liberal divorce laws have negative effects on long-term outcomes for children (Gruber, 
2004). On the other hand, recent research suggests that divorce increases physical and 
psychological well-being for both partners (Gardner and Oswald, 2005; Stevenson and 
Wolfers, 2006). Thus it seems clear that divorce legislation has potential effects on large 
segments of the population and on several important dimensions related to both economic 
and psychological well-being. 
The rise in divorce rates has been very pronounced in Europe since the 1960’s. 
Virtually all European countries experienced less than 2.5 divorces per 1,000 married 
people in 1960, and many had divorce rates below 1 (see Figure 1). By 2002, most 
European countries had divorce rates around 5 per 1000 married people or higher.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
During the last four decades of the 20th century, many legal reforms took place in 
Europe at the national level that allowed divorce under mutual consent and “no-fault” 
grounds or even unilaterally. This raises the question of whether these reforms that 
tended to “make divorce easier” were at least partially responsible for the widespread 
increase in divorce rates. 
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This question has relevant policy implications, since several countries have recently 
been considering additional reforms in their divorce laws.1 They are also pertinent given 
current initiatives studying the possible harmonization of family law within the European 
Union (Boele-Woelki, 2005; European Commission, 2005).     
We use panel data on 18 European countries from 1950 to 2003 to analyze the effect 
of changes in divorce laws on the divorce rate. We identify this causal relationship by 
exploiting the variation across countries in the timing and nature of the reforms, while 
controlling for fixed and trending unobserved factors at the country level that may be 
related to both divorce laws and divorce rates. We also analyze the extent to which the 
effects of the reforms are transitory or permanent. 
Our analysis builds on a previous body of literature, both theoretical and empirical, 
that analyzed the effect of unilateral divorce on divorce rates in the United States. 
Theoretically, an application of the Coase theorem to marital bargaining suggests that the 
allocation of resources should be unaffected by the distribution of property rights and 
hence the law would have no effect on the incidence of divorce (Becker et al., 1977; 
Becker, 1981). Under mutual consent, for a divorce to take place the spouse who wishes 
to leave would have to compensate the one who wants to stay married. Under unilateral 
divorce, the break-up will take place unless the spouse who wishes to stay compensates 
the one who wishes to leave.  
                                                 
1 Reforms liberalizing divorce took place in France in 2005 and in Spain in 2005, while there are current 
initiatives in the US in favour of making divorce easier in some states (such as New York) and more 
restrictive on others (such as Ohio). 
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Other theoretical papers have questioned the applicability of the Coase theorem in the 
marital bargaining setup (Clark, 1999; Fella et al., 2004) and conclude that under a 
bargaining framework divorce law may affect the probability of divorce. Specifically, 
Fella et al. (2004) note that the “changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be 
responsible for increasing divorce rates”. (p.607)   
Empirical estimates of the effect of divorce law on divorce rates have produced 
mixed results. Peters (1986, 1992) found that the unilateral reforms in the US had no 
effect on the divorce rate; however, these results were criticized by Allen (1992). 
Friedberg (1998) found that unilateral divorce laws were responsible for about 17 percent 
of the increase in divorce rates in the US during the 1970’s and 1980’s. Her results were 
widely accepted until Wolfers (2006), using a slightly modified specification, found that 
the effect of unilateral divorce is small and short-lived. No consensus has been reached 
on the subject to date. 
We contribute to the debate by examining the impact of different divorce law reforms 
on the divorce rate using a long panel of European data. We find that the reforms that 
“made divorce easier” were followed by significant increases in divorce rates. Moreover, 
the effect of the move towards “no-fault” divorce laws seemed permanent (allowing for 
the time scale of the panel) with strong, significant long-term effects. However, the 
introduction of unilateral divorce increased divorce rates only in the short term, with the 
number of divorces going back to its previous level after a few years. According to our 
most conservative estimates, the combined effect of all the legal reforms that took place 
in Europe between 1960 and 2002 amounts to about 20% of the increase in divorce rates 
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in Europe during that period. The remaining unexplained increase in divorce rates may be 
due to, for example, changes in social norms across Europe. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the 
previous literature on the effect of divorce laws on divorce rates. The subsequent section 
describes divorce laws in Europe and the main reforms that took place since 1950. 
Section 4 discusses the data and the econometric specification, while section 5 presents 
the main results and some additional regressions and robustness checks. The final section 
summarizes the results and concludes. 
2. Related Literature 
Conventional wisdom suggests that making divorce easier should lead to higher divorce 
rates. This is in fact the argument used in recent years by certain groups in the US 
claiming that no-fault and unilateral divorce laws are contributing to the destruction of 
the traditional family and should therefore be reversed.2  
Economic theory in the form of bargaining models supports this conventional wisdom 
and predicts that divorce laws may have an effect on the incidence of divorce (Clark, 
1999; Fella et al., 2004) even in the absence of transaction costs and informational 
asymmetries. Clark (1999) and Fella et al. (2004) focus on how assets are allocated 
within a marriage and the different bargaining outcomes for the asset allocation on 
                                                 
2 For instance, Americans for Divorce Reform (www.divorcereform.org) claim that ‘"No fault" doubled an 
already high divorce rate shortly after it was introduced. (…) The radical swing from 100% fault-based 
divorce to 100% unilateral non-binding marriage is a failed experiment. It pushed us into a whole new form 
of family life that is not sustainable’. 
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divorcing. Hence both the asset allocation and the right to dissolve a marriage (e.g. no 
fault versus unilateral) determine the gains and losses, and the incidence of divorce. 
However, another branch of theoretical literature contradicts this prediction (Becker 
et al., 1977; Becker, 1981; Peters, 1986). According to their model, allowing unilateral 
divorce (from a previous requirement of mutual consent) should not make divorce more 
likely, since the reform would only reassign existing property rights between spouses 
(assuming perfect information and no transaction costs).  
This is in fact a direct application of the Coase theorem, and the prediction is that a 
law change from mutual to unilateral divorce would alter the property rights and resulting 
compensation scheme between the spouses, but it would not make them more likely to 
divorce. Specifically, the rights would be redistributed from the spouse who does not 
want to divorce to the one who wishes to leave. However, some have pointed that the 
assumptions behind the Coase theorem may fail to hold in the context of marital 
bargaining (Parkman 1992; Stevenson and Wolfers 2006).  
There have been several attempts to test the theoretical predictions with US data. 
Peters (1986, 1992) and Allen (1992) used cross-sectional data to test whether people 
living in states with unilateral divorce were more likely to divorce than others. They used 
different sets of controls and arrived at different conclusions. Peters estimated an effect of 
unilateral laws close to zero, while Allen found that unilateral divorce increased the 
probability of divorce by 1.4 percent. Later work has improved the identification strategy 
by using panel data, which allows for the inclusion of state fixed effects and state-specific 
trends. Using a panel from 1968 to 1988, Friedberg (1998) found that unilateral divorce 
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reforms had significant and permanent effects on divorce rates, accounting for about one 
sixth of the increase in divorce rates during the period. In a recent paper, Wolfers (2006) 
revised Friedberg’s results with a longer panel and a slightly modified methodology, and 
found that unilateral divorce does not have permanent effects on the divorce rate. 
This paper contributes to this literature by estimating the extent to which the divorce 
law reforms in Europe have contributed to the increase in divorce rates using a panel of 
18 European countries from 1950 to 2003. This paper extends on the previous analyses 
by offering insights on the impact of several different types of reforms (rather than just 
the move to a unilateral divorce as examined in the previous literature). The long panel 
and the different timing and nature of the reforms that took place during the period across 
European countries offer an appealing identification strategy for the estimation of the 
effect of divorce laws on divorce rates. 
3. Divorce Laws in Europe, 1950-2003 
Most European countries had laws regulating divorce dating from the first half of the 20th 
century or earlier. The exceptions were Italy, Spain and Ireland, where divorce was 
banned until 1970, 1981, and 1996, respectively.3 During the 1950’s and 1960’s, many 
countries allowed divorce only on the basis of “fault”, the fault grounds typically 
including adultery and physical violence.4 Some countries (mostly in Scandinavia) also 
allowed divorce after a certain separation period. 
                                                 
3 Divorce was also banned for Catholics in Portugal until 1975.  
4 Under a “fault” regime, the right to file for divorce is available unilaterally to an innocent party if his/her 
spouse is guilty of a serious matrimonial offense, such as adultery. It is necessary to present proof of fault 
in court before a judge. 
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The so-called “no-fault revolution” started in the 1970’s, when many countries 
introduced grounds for divorce in addition to (or in replacement of) fault, typically the 
“irretrievable breakdown” of the marriage, of which mutual consent was usually 
considered proof. Many countries went further and at some point introduced “unilateral 
divorce”, which allowed divorce on request by only one of the spouses, thus dropping the 
pre-requisite of mutual agreement.  
The characterization of the different reforms (over 20 of them between 1970 and 
2000) is complicated by the large variation regarding specific details such as the breadth 
of no-fault grounds or differing separation requirements. Friedberg (1998) notes the 
difficulty in categorizing situations where separation during a certain period of time is the 
only grounds for unilateral divorce. Thus we will explore the sensitivity of the results to 
different definitions of unilateral divorce.  
Table 1 summarizes the main changes in divorce laws that took place in 18 European 
countries between 1950 and 2003.5 Ten countries had already adopted no-fault divorce 
before 1950, while the remaining eight moved to no-fault between 1971 and 1997.6 Five 
countries had explicitly incorporated unilateral divorce by 2003, and another 12 countries 
implicitly allowed for a spouse to divorce unilaterally after a required separation period, 
which was considered proof of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.  The different 
countries also vary in terms of the separation period required in the case of unilateral 
                                                 
5 The dates correspond to the year when a certain reform was implemented, which is often the year after the 
legislation was passed. 
6 Germany, Austria and Switzerland had what has been called a “weak fault” regime already before 1950 
(Smith, 2002). We include “weak-fault” as “no-fault” since these regimes specified “a rather open-ended, 
non-specific fault ground that can flexibly accommodate a wide range of provable matrimonial offenses, 
possibly even of a relatively minor character” (Smith, 2002, p. 215). These regimes also allowed divorce 
on the basis of a three-year separation. 
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demand, with only Finland and Sweden allowing for unilateral divorce without any 
separation requirement.7 This large variation in the timing of the reforms will be 
exploited in the econometric analysis in order to identify the effect of the law changes on 
divorce rates. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
The longitudinal data on divorce rates cover 18 European countries from 1950 to 2003 
inclusive. The data for the annual number of divorces, population and married population 
figures are publicly available from Eurostat for the following countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany excluding ex-GDR, Finland, France, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.8   
The main dependent variable in the analysis is the divorce rate, defined as annual 
divorces per thousand married people. The analysis is also performed using divorces per 
thousand people, in order to facilitate the comparison with previous studies (results are 
available upon request).9  
                                                 
7 The information on divorce legislation across countries was gathered from Boele-Woelki et al. (2003, 
2004), Dutoit (2000), and Smith (2002). 
8 Data from the United Nations and/or national statistical offices were used for data points not available 
from Eurostat. The detailed sources are available upon request. In particular, there were many gaps in the 
series for married population. Thus we impute married population by country using the available data 
points, plus a linear and a quadratic trend. Specifications with only linear trends and with linear, quadratic 
and cubic trends were also estimated and did not affect the results. 
9 Both Friedberg (1998) and Wolfers (2003) used divorces per thousand population as the main dependent 
variable in their analyses. 
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We favor the use of annual divorces per married people because marriage rates 
changed significantly during the second half of the 20th century, and they did so at 
different rates across countries, thus affecting the population “at risk” of divorce.  We 
may also worry that the divorce law changes may impact the quality and quantity of the 
marriage market matches. As Wolfers (2006) argues, on one hand, the divorce rate may 
increase due to “reduced exit costs” that may lead to lower quality matches. On the other 
hand, easier divorce may reduce the benefits of marriage and hence decrease the 
proportion of the ever-married population. However, even large effects on the number of 
new marriages would affect the stock of marriages very slowly.   
The aggregate number of divorces per thousand married people in the 18 countries in 
the sample was 1.2 in 1960, while it had risen to 3.6 by 2002 (see Figure 2). The divorce 
rate (per thousand married people) by country from 1950 until 2003, aggregated by 
decade, is shown in Table 2. Note that divorce rates rose in all countries during the 
period. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The analysis relies on a number of quasi-experiments to assess the impact of different 
divorce law reforms on divorce rates. First of all, four countries that used to ban divorce 
introduced no-fault divorce legislation between 1971 and 1997 (Ireland, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain). Another four countries that allowed divorce only on the basis of fault adopted 
no fault legislation during the 1970’s (see Table 1). All countries but Ireland and Italy 
had introduced some form of unilateral divorce by 2003, most of them with separation 
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requirements. Thirteen countries underwent reforms that introduced some form of 
unilateral divorce between 1960 and 2003, while Finland, Norway and Sweden had 
already introduced (implicitly) unilateral divorce before 1950. Typically, countries with 
“implicitly” unilateral legislation considered a certain separation period to be proof of the 
“irretrievable breakdown” of the marriage, which was in turn a ground for divorce. 
Finally, five countries adopted explicitly unilateral divorce legislation between 1974 and 
1993 (two of them, Finland and Sweden, with no separation requirement). 
Examining the impact of the no-fault and unilateral reforms on the divorce rates is 
clearly quasi-experimental, relying on identification by the variation in the timing of the 
reforms across reform countries. However, a direct comparison of reform and control 
countries would imply assuming that the variation in the legislative reforms across 
countries is exogenous. This seems a questionable assumption since countries that had 
higher divorce rates in 1950 were also more likely to introduce reforms that liberalized 
divorce in subsequent years (see Table 2). It is likely that countries differ in unobservable 
dimensions, such as social norms, that are related to both divorce rates and legislative 
activity.  
We account for pre-existing differences across countries through the inclusion of 
country fixed-effects in the regressions. Moreover, it is still conceivable that such 
unobservable factors as social norms or demographic trends are evolving over time at 
different paces in different countries. For instance, countries where the stigma associated 
with divorce was diminishing faster would experience higher increases in divorce rates 
and could also be more likely to pass laws making divorce easier. We account for this 
possibility by including country-specific linear, quadratic and cubic trends in our 
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different regression specifications. Hence we are quite confident that we are removing 
both fixed and time-varying unobserved factors at the country level that could otherwise 
bias our results. If anything, we may worry that part of the effect of the reforms might be 
captured by the country-specific trends. This issue will be discussed in more detail in 
section 5. 
Our initial estimation strategy replicates Friedberg’s methodology (Friedberg, 1998). 
Friedberg estimates the following equation: 
(1)  
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The variable law is a dichotomous variable set to equal one when a reform is effective 
in country i and time period t. Hence, the coefficient β is interpreted as the average rise in 
the divorce rate due to the legal change. In our setup, we introduce four separate 
dummies for each of the four legislative changes (legal, no fault, unilateral, explicitly 
unilateral) and interpret each of the coefficients equivalently. Country and year fixed 
effects in Equation (1) control for pre-existing differences in country-specific divorce 
probabilities, as well as for evolving unobserved factors that affect divorce in all 
countries in the sample. A less restrictive specification allows for country specific time 
trends, which control for, for example, social and demographic trends within a country. 
We also estimate specifications that add quadratic and cubic trends for each country. 
Equation (1) is estimated by population-weighted least squares on an unbalanced panel. 
The number of observations is 916.10
                                                 
10 The data on the annual number of divorces is missing for the fifties and/or 2003 for some countries. 
 12
A potential problem with this methodology is that it might confound pre-existing 
trends in divorce rates with the dynamic response of a policy shock, as suggested by 
Wolfers (2006). In other words, β in equation (1) only captures a discrete series break. 
Wolfers (2006) adopted an alternative approach that traced out the full adjustment path, 
and his results indicated that Friedberg’s approach leads to misleading conclusions on the 
impact of divorce legislation on the divorce rate. Hence to account for the dynamic 
response to the legislative change we estimate the following equation: 
(2) 
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Whereas in Equation (1) the law dummy captures the full adjustment process, 
equation (2) traces out the adjustment path with the inclusion of dummies for the law 
having been effective for 1-2 years, 3-4 years and so on. These variables capture the 
dynamic response of divorce while the country-specific time trends identify pre-existing 
trends. It is of considerable interest to examine the full adjustment process as there is 
often “a temporary boost to divorce rates as a backlog of long dead marriages are given 
an opportunity for legal burial under new legislation” (Smith, 2002, p. 220). Thus these 
additional specifications allow us to detect to what extent the effects of the reforms are 
temporary or permanent. 
5. Results 
5.1 Discrete jump approach 
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Table 3 reports the estimates for Equation (1), the dependent variable being the annual 
number of divorces per thousand married people. The specification shown in column 1 
includes only the four reform dummies, while column 2 adds year effects. All four types 
of reforms show positive and significant coefficients in the initial specifications. Adding 
country effects (column 3) reduces the size of the coefficients for unilateral and no-fault 
considerably, and the legal coefficient turns negative. The three remaining columns add 
linear, quadratic and cubic trends, thus accounting for time-varying country-specific 
factors that may be related to both divorce rates and divorce law reforms.  
The coefficient on legal becomes positive and significant again when we include cubic 
trends (and remains so in specifications including quartic trends).11 The intuition for the 
negative sign in previous specifications is that fitting a linear trend to divorce rates in 
countries where divorce was illegal at the beginning of the period will result in divorce 
rates that are below the trend in the years immediately following the reform. The final 
specification suggests that legalizing divorce increases divorce rates from zero to about 
0.23 divorces per 1,000 married people. 
The coefficients on no-fault, unilateral and strictly unilateral reforms are practically 
always positive and strongly significant, indicating that countries that introduced those 
reforms experienced significant subsequent increases in divorce rates, relative to the 
control countries. The size of the no-fault coefficient remains essentially unchanged once 
we introduce the country fixed effects. The final specification indicates that no-fault 
legislation increases divorce rates by about 0.41 divorces per 1,000 married people. The 
effect of introducing (implicitly) unilateral divorce is estimated at 0.35 to 0.48 in 
                                                 
11 The results with quartic trends are available upon request. 
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specifications 4 and 5, but the size of the coefficient drops significantly and becomes 
insignificant in the last specification. Finally, introducing strictly unilateral divorce is 
estimated to raise divorce rates by 0.71 divorces per 1,000 married people, and the effect 
does not vary much across specifications.12
The magnitudes of the estimated effects are sizeable compared with the average 
divorce rate of 2.64. The estimates suggest that divorce rates would have been 13% lower 
in 2002 if none of the 1960-2002 reforms towards no-fault or unilateral divorce had taken 
place.13 Thus, these results suggest that the move towards no-fault, unilateral divorce 
accounted for about 20% of the increase in divorce rates in Europe between 1960 and 
2002.14
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
5.2 Dynamic approach 
The results in section 5.1 show a worrying sensitivity to the inclusion of the country 
trends. One reason might be the presence of omitted variable bias, which would be 
accounted for with the introduction of the trends, as suggested by Friedberg (1998). 
However, another possibility is that the trends are confounding pre-existing trends with 
the response of the divorce rate to the policy shocks, as pointed out by Wolfers (2006). 
We address this concern in part by using a long panel that includes a large number of 
                                                 
12 The results are very similar when using divorces per thousand people as the dependent variable. In 
particular, the signs and significance levels of the coefficients remain unchanged, as well as their relative 
size. 
13 The model predicts an aggregate divorce rate for 2002 of 3.16 in the absence of the reforms, compared 
with the actual divorce rate of 3.64. 
14 The actual increase in divorce rates from 1960 to 2002 was from 1.26 to 3.64, i.e., a 2.38 points increase. 
Our counterfactual increase (from 1.26 to 3.16) amounts to 1.9 points, which represents about 80% of the 
actual one. Thus the remaining 20% is attributable to the reforms. 
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observations prior to any of the reforms. This section estimates additional specifications 
that relax the discrete-jump assumption and allow us to distinguish short-term from 
permanent effects of the reforms. They also act as robustness checks for the results in the 
previous models.  
Table 4 reports the dynamic effect of divorce law changes for no-fault, unilateral and 
explicitly unilateral reforms (see Equation 2). For instance, column 1 shows the results 
from estimating a regression where the effect of no-fault reforms is allowed to vary over 
time, while the rest of the reforms are still accounted for with single dummies.15 The 
specifications shown in Table 4 all include year and country dummies, plus country-
specific linear, quadratic and cubic trends. The effect of legalizing divorce is estimated at 
0.23 to 0.44 divorces per 1,000 married people, similar to the results in the discrete jump 
specifications (Table 3). However, no-fault reforms are estimated to have a much 
stronger effect in the dynamic specification (column 1). The discrete jump regressions 
showed an effect of 0.41 to 0.47 divorces per 1,000 married people, and this magnitude is 
similar to the estimated effect during the first two years following the reform in Table 4. 
The effect remains significant over time and its magnitude is in fact increasing, so that in 
the long term, the divorce rate would increase by as much as 2 divorces per 1,000 married 
people (the coefficient for 15 years and more) as a result of no-fault legislation.  
On the other hand, the dynamic specifications suggest that reforms allowing unilateral 
divorce do not have a permanent effect on divorce rates. Reforms that allow for unilateral 
                                                 
15 We also run specifications where all four types of reforms are allowed to have time-varying effects, and 
the results are very similar to those reported in Table 4.  
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divorce only implicitly and after a certain separation period increase the divorce rate by 
about 0.04 in the first four years (column 2), and the effect reaches 0.18 eight years after 
the reform.16 However, this positive effect is not significant, and after the initial ten-year 
period, it becomes negative (although mostly still not significant). As for the estimated 
effect of explicitly unilateral reforms (column 3), it is significant but short-lived: a 0.87 
increase in the divorce rate during the two years following the reform turns insignificant 
in the third and fourth post-reform years, and the sign is actually reversed (although not 
significantly) starting year seven.17
The magnitude of the effects is only slightly altered when we include the dynamic 
effects for all three types of reforms at once, as well as when we include dynamics for 
legal. We also check the sensitivity of these results to the exclusion of the cubic, 
quadratic and linear trends. The results always show a strong, long-term effect of no-fault 
reforms, and a significant but short-lived effect of unilateral reforms.18   
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
5.3 Additional specifications and robustness checks  
The results seem robust to a number of alternative specifications. We explore different 
degrees of unilateral divorce legislation, in an attempt to understand whether the type of 
unilateral divorce matters. These results are reported in Table 5. The first column shows 
                                                 
16 The negative sign on the first two years after the reform is caused by Germany, where divorce rates 
dropped significantly the year after unilateral divorce was introduced, possibly due to the introduction of a 
separation requirement. 
17 Again, the results are very similar when using divorces per thousand people as the dependent variable. 
The main difference is that in the specification with dynamic effects for unilateral, the coefficients are 
significantly positive for years 3 to 12 after the reform. 
18 Note that the effect of implicit unilateral is significantly positive in the specifications without the 
country-specific cubic trends. 
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the results of using (implicit) unilateral as the only measure of unilateral divorce, while 
columns 2 and 3 use progressively stricter definitions (explicitly unilateral and explicitly 
unilateral with no separation period). The last column shows the results of including both 
(implicit) unilateral and unilateral with no separation period.  
Legal and no-fault are significantly positive in all four specifications. The coefficient 
on unilateral is always positive but insignificant, and no clear effect is discernible in the 
dynamic specifications (not shown). Note, however, that both explicit unilateral and 
unilateral with no separation period are always significantly positive. The positive effect 
of explicit unilateral appears to last only for the first two years after the law is 
implemented, while the introduction of unilateral divorce with no separation period 
appears to significantly increase the number of divorces for up to 6 years after 
implementation.19 Thus we conclude that although the type of unilateral legislation 
matters, the effect of any kind of unilateral divorce legislation on divorce rates appears to 
be transitory. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Regressions were also estimated with additional minor changes in the definition of 
unilateral and explicitly unilateral for those countries where there was any doubt about 
the timing or the nature of the reforms.20 The only relevant change is that explicitly 
                                                 
19 The results from the dynamic specifications are available upon request. 
20 Essentially Belgium, Greece and Switzerland. 
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unilateral reforms become less significant when we include Switzerland in the reform 
countries.21  
 The use of a 54-year-long panel may raise doubts about the validity of the time 
trends, especially when including quadratic and cubic trends. Thus we also estimated 
regressions with a shorter version of the panel (1960 to 2002), with similar results.22 The 
only relevant change is that the dynamic effect of unilateral is now significantly positive 
for a few more years following the reform. 
 We may also worry that only a few countries may be driving most of the results, so 
we estimated the regressions for 17 countries, dropping one individual country at a time. 
The results did not seem overly sensitive to the exclusion of any specific country. 
However, and as expected, the significance of reforms legalizing divorce relied on 
including Italy and Spain, and the significance of no-fault dropped with the exclusion of 
Germany. Also, the explicitly unilateral coefficients dropped in size and significance 
when excluding Sweden from the sample. 
 Finally, we estimated Tobit models to account for the fact that the divorce rate was 
zero for a number of years in those countries that legalized divorce during the 1950-2003 
period, with similar results for all the law indicators.  
                                                 
21 Switzerland adopted unilateral divorce in 2000. 
22 Regressions were estimated with a balanced panel spanning from 1960 to 2002. 
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 All of the robustness checks supported the main conclusions: that the reforms that 
liberalized divorce in Europe tended to increase divorce rates significantly, and the 
effects were permanent for no-fault reforms but only temporary for unilateral reforms.23  
6. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes a panel of 18 European countries spanning from 1950 to 2003 to 
examine the extent to which the legal reforms leading to “easier divorce” that took place 
during the second half of the 20th century have contributed to the increase in divorce rates 
across Europe.  
According to the Coase theorem, unilateral divorce should not affect divorce rates 
since it simply reassigns existing property rights between spouses. However, some 
previous studies for the US found significant increases in divorce rates following reforms 
that introduced unilateral divorce. We find that countries allowing unilateral divorce 
experienced significant increases in divorce rates in the years following the reform. 
However, the effect of the reforms seemed to have taken place during the first few years 
following the legal change, fading over time so that divorce rates were back to their 
previous levels a few years after the reforms were implemented. On the other hand, the 
effects of introducing no-fault divorce legislation (unilateral or not) seemed stronger and 
more permanent. 
The combined effect of all the legal reforms that took place in Europe between 1960 
and 2002, including the reforms that moved from fault to no-fault or that introduced 
                                                 
23 The full regression results mentioned in this section are available upon request. 
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(implicitly or explicitly) unilateral divorce, amounts to about 20% of the increase in 
divorce rates in Europe during that period, according to our most conservative estimates. 
These results support and extend the findings of previous studies that used US data to 
address the effect of divorce legislation on divorce rates, such as Friedberg (1998) and 
Wolfers (2006). Like Wolfers (2006), we find that unilateral reforms appear to increase 
divorce rates only temporarily. But we also show that what really seemed to have a 
permanent effect on divorce rates was the generalization of no-fault grounds for divorce. 
Hence, while it seems clear that family law has a potential effect on marriage dissolution, 
unilateral divorce cannot be blamed for the generalized increase in divorce rates across 
countries during the second half of the 20th century. 
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Figure 1. Divorce Rates in Five European Countries, 1960-2003 
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Figure 2. Aggregate Divorce Rate in 18 European Countries, 1960-2002 
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Table 1. Divorce Laws by Country, 1950-2003. 
 
(1) (2) (3) Country 
Year when divorce 
allowed 
No-fault Unilateral,         no-
fault 
Austria pre-1950 pre-1950 (1978) 
Belgium pre-1950 pre-1950 1975 
Denmark pre-1950 pre-1950 (1970), 1989 
Finland pre-1950 pre-1950 (pre-1950), 1988 
France pre-1950 1976 (1976) 
Germany inc. GDR 
after 1991 
pre-1950 pre-1950 (1977) 
Greece pre-1950 1979 (1983) 
Iceland pre-1950 pre-1950 (1993) 
Ireland 1997 1997 no 
Italy 1971 1975 no 
Luxembourg pre-1950 pre-1950 (1979) 
Netherlands pre-1950 1971 (1971) 
Norway pre-1950 pre-1950 (pre-1950), 1993 
Portugal 1977 1977 (1977) 
Spain 1981 1981 (1981) 
Sweden pre-1950 pre-1950 (pre-1950), 1974 
Switzerland pre-1950 pre-1950 (2000) 
UK* pre-1950 1971 (1971) 
 
Sources: Boele-Woelki et al. (2003, 2004), Dutoit (2000), and Smith (2002). 
Notes: Column 1 shows the year when divorce was first allowed. Column 2 shows the year when no-fault 
grounds for divorce were first introduced. No-fault grounds for a divorce include irretrievable breakdown, 
irreconcilable differences and/or incompatibility. Column 3 shows the year when unilateral, no-fault 
divorce was first allowed. Unilateral divorce does not require mutual consent and can be granted at the 
request of either spouse. A year in parenthesis means that unilateral divorce was not introduced explicitly, 
but was in fact possible after a certain separation period, which served as proof of irretrievable breakdown 
of the marriage.* The divorce law for Scotland post-dates that of England and Wales by five years. The 
current analysis does not take this into account. 
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Table 2. Divorce rates, by country 
 
  Annual divorces per thousand married people     
  1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-2003
Austria 2.95 2.62 3.23 4.18 5.07 
Belgium 0.97 1.13 2.04 3.52 5.29 
Denmark 2.99 3.05 5.52 6.36 6.32 
Germany 3.91 3.03 3.82 4.81 4.57 
Finland 2.06 2.40 4.39 4.93 6.62 
France  1.37 1.60 2.21 2.01 
Greece  0.80 0.86 1.44 1.63 
Iceland 2.10 2.47 4.21 5.13 5.30 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0.63 
Italy 0 0 0.55 0.67 1.09 
Luxembourg 0.73 0.98 1.93 3.76 4.63 
Netherlands 1.28 1.20 2.87 4.39 4.66 
Norway 1.36 1.49 2.70 4.15 5.67 
Portugal 0.21 1.80 0.68 1.68 2.92 
Spain 0 0 0 0.97 1.76 
Sweden 2.41 2.68 5.26 5.52 6.53 
Switzerland 1.97 1.94 2.99 3.71 4.70 
United      
Kingdom   1.47 4.37 6.08 6.68 
 
Sources: Eurostat and national statistical offices. 
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  2  3  4  5   
Table 3. Static effects of divorce law changes; dependent variable: annual divorces per thousand married people 
 
  1 6   
  
  
 Basic 
specification 
  
 
Adding 
year effects  
Adding 
country effects  
Adding 
country trends  
Adding 
quadratic trends  
Adding 
cubic trends 
 
Legal 1,299 *** 1,245*** -0,575*** -0,353*** -0,132  0,228 ** 
         
        
        
        
       
        
         
(0,198) (0,209) (0,129) (0,116) (0,114) (0,114)
No fault 
 
0,909 *** 1,245*** 0,469*** 0,449*** 0,060  0,411 *** 
(0,174) (0,194) (0,114) (0,103) (0,095) (0,101)
Unilateral 
 
1,288 *** 1,641*** 0,232** 0,484*** 0,348*** 0,027  
(0,123) (0,142) (0,103) (0,092) (0,082) (0,093)
Explicitly unilateral 
 
1,832 *** 1,856*** 1,668*** 0,138  0,451** 0,711 *** 
(0,256)
 
(0,257)
 
(0,183)
 
(0,182)
 
(0,182)
 
(0,194)
 
Year effects No  Yes (F=0.87)  Yes (F=5.68) *** Yes (F=5.72) *** Yes (F=5.95) *** Yes (F=5,77) *** 
Country effects No  No  Yes (F=167.24) *** Yes (F=46.05) *** Yes (F=31.93) *** Yes (F=10.68) *** 
Country trends No  No  No  Yes (F=84.75)
 
*** Yes (F=33.50) *** Yes (F=12.38) *** 
Quadratic trends No No No No Yes (F=21.77)
 
*** Yes (F=12,68) ***
Cubic trends No No No No No  Yes (F=12.49) ***
Adjusted R2 0,4481   0,444   0,8705   0,9535   0,9668   0,9719   
 
Sample: 1950-2003, n = 916 (unbalanced panel). Estimated using country married population weights. 
Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 4. Dynamic effects of divorce law changes; dependent variable: annual divorces 
per thousand married people 
 
  1   2   3   
  No fault   Unilateral   Exp. unilateral   
Legal 0,4373 (0,1123) *** 0,2692 (0,1081) ** 0,2337 (0,1140) **
No fault   0,4520 (0,0954) *** 0,4105 (0,1011) ***
Unilateral 0,0559 (0,0898)    0,0133 (0,0932)  
Explicitly unilateral 0,6768 (0,1859) *** 0,6345 (0,1821) ***   
N-f years 1-2 0,4554 (0,1072) ***     
N-f y. 3-4 0,7252 (0,1126) ***     
N-f y. 5-6 0,8368 (0,1308) ***     
N-f y. 7-8 1,1172 (0,1461) ***     
N-f y. 9-10 1,3549 (0,1642) ***     
N-f y. 11-12 1,5517 (0,1838) ***     
N-f y. 13-14 1,7409 (0,1987) ***     
N-f y. 15+ 2,1159 (0,2220) ***     
Unilat. years 1-2   -0,2966 (0,0991) ***   
Unilat. years 3-4   0,0439 (0,1098)    
Unilat. years 5-6   0,1325 (0,1203)    
Unilat. years 7-8   0,1770 (0,1382)    
Unilat. years 9-10   0,0979 (0,1549)    
Unilat. years 11-12   -0,0084 (0,1707)    
Unilat. years 13-14   -0,2392 (0,1858)    
Unilat. years 15+   -0,5791 (0,2131) ***   
Exp. unil. years 1-2     0,8665 (0,2526) ***
Exp. unil. y. 3-4     0,4358 (0,2862)  
Exp. unil. y. 5-6     0,2039 (0,3296)  
Exp. unil. y. 7-8     -0,0215 (0,3811)  
Exp. unil. y. 9-10     -0,0375 (0,4395)  
Exp. unil. y. 11-12     -0,1345 (0,5013)  
Exp. unil. y. 13-14     -0,1967 (0,5672)  
Exp. unil. y. 15+     -0,1751 (0,6432)  
       
Year effects Yes, F=7.74 *** Yes, F=4.22 *** Yes, F=5.55 ***
Country effects Yes, F=8.45 *** Yes, F=15.04 *** Yes, F=9.00 ***
Country trends Yes, F=15.98 *** Yes, F=12.69 *** Yes, F=12.41 ***
Quadratic trends Yes, F=15.51 *** Yes, F=13.80 *** Yes, F=12.75 ***
Cubic trends Yes, F=14.73 *** Yes, F=14.37 *** Yes, F=12.44 ***
Adjusted R2 0,9742   0,9752   0,972   
 
Sample: 1950-2003, n= 916 (unbalanced panel) Estimated using country married population 
weights.Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively.
Table 5. Effect of unilateral divorce; dependent variable: annual divorces per thousand married people 
 
  1           2 3 4
 Only         Only Only Unilateral +
  unilateral   explicit unilat.   no sep. period   no sep. period   
Legal 0.2333 (0.115) ** 0.2453 (0.1179) ** 0.2310 (0.1120) ** 0.2278 (0.1121) **
No fault 0.3664 (0.1013)     
      
      
            
*** 0.4399 (0.0887) *** 0.4260 (0.0812) *** 0.3784 (0.0988) ***
Unilateral 0.0761(0.093)  0.0768 (0.0906)
Unilateral, explicit  0.7266 (0.1944) ***
Unilateral, no sep. period         1.9337 (0.2950) *** 1.934 (0.2951) ***
Adjusted R2 0.9714 0.9715 0.9729 0.9729
 
Sample: 1950-2003, n= 916 (unbalanced panel) Estimated using country married population weights.  
Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
All specifications include country dummies, year dummies, and country-specific linear, quadratic and cubic trends. 
 
 
 30
